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ABSTRACT
Highway system is vital in urban transportation network. Operating, maintain-
ing and financing of existing highway (a.k.a. brownfield highway) are increas-
ingly important. Public-Private Partnership(PPP) is implemented in various
countries to solve problems in urban transportation infrastructure projects. In
this paper, we will mathematically model PPP to discuss whether government
could achieve social optimum for free in urban highway PPP project. Previous
modelling methods in PPP share two common shortcomings: over-simplified
assumption on behavior of users and owners of the highway and insufficient
attention to privately-held information. In this paper, we create a new form of
PPP, improved Investment Public-Private Partnership using mechanism design
as a multi-leader-multi-follower (MLMF) Stackelberg game. The implementibil-
ity in MLMF Stackelberg game in dominant strategy and Bayesian equilibria are
derived and the feasibility of the model is proved through these theorems. The
condition is discussed and given on achieving social optimal and budget bal-
ance simultaneously, that is the government gets job done for free. The Sioux-
Falls network model is used to illustrate and verify the model.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, urban transportation system is fundamental in American trans-
portation system. The highway system play the key role in urban area. It
connects major population centers, public transportation facilities, and differ-
ent transportation destinations. However, such system is suffering from several
problems in both supply and demand sides. On the demand side, traffic con-
gestion harms logistic efficiency and causes enormous economic losses. In 2011,
congestion in America costs drivers $121 billion and 5.5 billion additional hours
on the road [13]. In 2012, 42% of America’s major urban highways remained
congested [21]. Meanwhile on the supply side, the government is lack of fund
and expertise in operating and maintaining the highways. Although the invest-
ment increased to $91 billion annually in 2012, it is still insufficient compared
with Federal Highway Administration’s estimation of $170 billion annually in
capital investment that is needed for significant improvement in pavement con-
ditions [21].
Therefore, designing, building, financing, operating and maintaining issues
in highway system are intensely investigated [4][27][1]. There are three kinds
of highway projects, greenfield highway project, which focuses on construct-
ing new highways, brownfield highway project, which focuses on managing
existing highways, and hybrid highway project, which is a mix of former two
projects. Compared with greenfield highway projects, brownfield projects are
more complicated because they draw more public concerns and hence are fac-
ing more political obstacles [22]. Currently, the mainstream of highway man-
agement projects in U.S. is government provision (i.e. the government takes
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charge of the whole project), which is already proven to be insufficient [4].
One popular and prevailing solution to that is Public-Private Partnership
(PPP). PPP has different definitions in different countries [23]. In the US, it is
defined as “a contractual agreement between a public agency (federal, state or
local) and a private sector entity” through which the skills, assets, rewards and
risks “are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general
public” [7]. Such projects are heavily utilized in the past decades in various
countries. As one of the primary incentives to apply PPP is saving government
spending budget, one question should be ask before kick off any project:
Could government achieve successful PPP project (i.e. social optimum) for
free?
To answer this question, mathematical modelling of PPP is needed. Many re-
searchers have attempted to model various aspects of the projects. Previous
methods include mathematical programming, game theory and simulation.
Mathematical programming is widely used in studying risk allocation,
bundling issues, investment, etc. Iossa et al.[14] presented a method mainly
based on optimization to compare the performance of PPP (“referred as
bundling building and operation into a single contract”) and public provision
under different conditions and assumptions. They pointed out that PPP is a de-
sired project form if the externality between building and operation is positive.
Engel et al. [6] provided a thorough investigation in PPP financing, including
project finance, investment cost, role of government, and renegotiation.
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Game theory is used to understand the interaction among different sectors
[30]. Among them, Medda [19] studied the allocation of risk between govern-
ment and private sector, Ho [11] modeled the financial renegotiation between
government and private sector, and Zou et al. [30] developed a game theory
model to understand the dynamic relationships between government and pri-
vate sector. Verhoef [24] evaluated the effect of auction on privatization of road
and provided various ‘indicators’ that government may use to optimize the bid.
Simulation is also used in the analysis of PPP. In Zhang et al. [29], an
agent-based simulation model was built to evaluate the competition between
privatized road and public road and help making pricing and capacity deci-
sions. Zhang [28] modeled the privatization of road network in an evolutionary
model. It is the first time to consider pricing, investment and ownership as a
whole.
There are also other methods which were used in modeling PPP. Martimort
et al. [18] applied task assignments in discussion of whether or not to bundle
the construction and management of infrastructure. Kang et al. [16] assessed
risks in PPP project using utility theory. Other theories, such as fuzzy set theory
[5], are also used in identification and measurement of risks in PPP project.
All previous works attempting to model PPP projects share two common
shortcomings:
Firstly, almost all previous works put simplified assumption on the users
of the road network. Some assumed that the demand is exogenous or inelastic
and some assumed that users of the road network, who is an important compo-
nent of the whole system, will not play strategically. However, some literature
3
in transportation analysis suggested that it is necessary to consider users of the
road as multiple players or a single player as a whole in the game theoretical
model to achieve more realistic and accurate results [12].
In this paper, we use Stachelberg game to model PPP project. Stackel-
berg game is a non-cooperative decision making problems where there are two
groups of players: the players who hold the powerful positions in the game
are referred as the leaders and other players who react to the leaders’ deci-
sions are called the followers [3]. In PPP project, private sectors, the leaders,
first determine the toll rate on all the roads they have rented, and then public
sectors, the followers, observing the toll rate in the network, make their deci-
sions to travel on the road. As both private sectors and public sectors are selfish
utility maximizers, this game is a non-cooperative multi-leader-multi-follower
(MLMF) Stackelberg game. By analyzing this game, we could predict the be-
havior of both groups of players and evaluate the outcome of PPP project.
The second one is paying insufficient attention to privately held informa-
tion. In a PPP project, one should admitted that some information necessary for
decision making is privately held, given maintenance effort or cost for exam-
ple. It is important to obtain this private information if the government wants
to implement an efficient and successful PPP project. Nonetheless, one should
also realize that revelation of information is not free [15]. In the point of view of
game theory, every player would play strategically to maximize their own ben-
efit or minimize their own cost, but such strategy usually may not be beneficial,
and sometimes may be harmful, to obtaining social optimal in the system. For
example, private sector has incentive to raise the toll rate to make the project
more profitable, and the price is usually higher than the social optimal one.
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Our paper introduces mechanism design into PPP modeling to overcome
such obstacle. Mechanism design is a theory that focuses on design of insti-
tutions to achieve certain objectives, with the assumption that all the players
will act strategically and hold private information necessary in decision making.
Although there are many advanced tools had already been used in modeling,
analyzing and evaluating PPP projects, mechanism design is not paid enough
attention. Only [14] used mechanism design to set up a truth-telling mechanism
to prevent cost overruns. However, applying mechanism design in PPP will en-
able us to deal with privately held information and hence to model the whole
project and determine key parameters more precisely, directly and easily.
In mechanism design, implementability is a key concept which indicates
whether a desired outcome could be achieved in a given equilibrium through
the mechanism [15]. There are plenty of literature investigating in the domi-
nant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and Bayesian incentive compatibil-
ity (BIC) in single level game [26], but discussion of DSIC and BIC in Stackelber
game context is insufficient. Only [8] addressed the single-leader-multi-follower
Stackelberg problem. We provides some sufficient and necessary conditions of
DSIC and BIC in MLMF Stackelberg game.
In this paper, we are going to answer the question ’could government man-
age transportation infrastructure for free?’ To do this, we will study PPP project
through mechanism design in a MLMF Stackelberg game. However, there are
two major problems when PPP is utilized in brownfield highway project: the
first is unrealistic price, that the price private sector charge is usually higher
than optimal level [22]. Government needs to regulate the private sector care-
fully in the contract. Another problem is lack of public support. Collecting
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toll on existing unpriced road usually incurs unsatisfactory from the users and
owners of the road, especially from residences who travel on the road in daily
commute. This is often a major public concern in utilizing PPP approach.
Investment Public-Private Partnership, aiming at resolving political discrep-
ancy in public, had been proposed recently [10]. Ideas that similar with IPPP
had achieved great success in management of local oil resources in Alaska. Ged-
des et al.[10] stated that IPPP will increase public support on road pricing, re-
duce income inequality among different families, and increase household in-
come. Although [10] using existing projects that are similar to IPPP to illustrate
the feasibility and advantages of IPPP, direct quantitative analysis is still absent
to verify their claims.
Main contributions In this paper our contribution could be summarized in
two parts. On methodology side, we provide the condition of a mechanism to
be DSIC and BIC in a MLMF Stackelberg game. Using these results, we mathe-
matically design and model a new form of PPP project, improved IPPP, which is
based on IPPP. On application side, by analyzing and evaluating the mathemat-
ical properties of improved IPPP, we derive the condition when system optimal
and budget balance could coexist in PPP project. This answers the question:
could government get PPP done for free? We also compare improved IPPP with
government provision, PPP and original IPPP and conclude that improved IPPP
has advantages in achieving potential Pareto-improvement, relief of tax distor-
tion, public support, better regulation on road pricing and lower financial risk.
To our best knowledge, there is no other literature comprehensively modeling
transportation infrastructure project management in mechanism design. Our
paper would provide insights for research in both mechanism design and in-
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frastructure project management.
In the following, section 2 explains IPPP and our model of improved IPPP,
section 3.1 derives some general and useful results in implementability in mech-
anism design context, section 4 applies these results on our model and proves
the feasibility of improved IPPP, section 5 shows an example of implementing
IPPP in Sioux-Falls network and section 6 serves as conclusion and provides
some possible direction in future work.
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CHAPTER 2
MODELLING IPPP WITH OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGN IN
MULTI-LEADER-MULTI-FOLLOWER (MLMF) STACKELBERG GAME
2.1 IPPP and improved IPPP
In an IPPP project, there are three participants:
• Government: Government takes charge in operating the IPPP project, in-
cluding holding auction, setting up lease contract with private sector, col-
lecting rent of highway and managing permanent fund;
• Private sector: Private sector rents highway from government and then be-
comes responsible for financing, operating and maintaining the highway
according to the standard required in contract provision;
• Public sector: Includes all residence in the jurisdiction that possesses the
highway and all travelers (users) using the highway.
As suggested by [10], an IPPP project works as follows: Government leases
highways to private sectors through concession. Then private sectors operate,
maintain the highway, collect toll as their income and pay the rent of highway
to government. Government invests the income from highway rent and set up
a permanent fund which is owned by all residence living within the jurisdic-
tion where the highway is priced. Such fund will be managed by professional
investors and dividends will be paid to all the owners.
In [10], the income of permanent fund (or rent of highway) is fixed on toll
rate and traffic flow. As we pointed out, the costs of private sectors and VOTs
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of public sectors are unknown and stochastic. A private sector with high main-
tenance cost needs to raise toll price to cover her cost. Meanwhile, a private
sector with low maintenance cost could also raise the price to sweeten up the
profit margin. The government should allow the former case while at the same
time prevent the latter case. Thus in our model, we make the rent of the high-
way to be floating and related to toll rate and traffic flow. This would provide
both better regulatory and lower financial risks. Such merit is enabled by using
of mechanism design. In order to distinguish our model to the idea in [10], we
call the one in our paper ‘improved IPPP’ or IPPP and refer the other one ‘origi-
nal IPPP’. The whole framework of IPPP project in this paper is shown in Figure
2.1.
Step 1: Government determines
the fluctuating rent rates of the highway according to
different toll rates and traffic flows.
Step 2: Private sectors are revealed with maintenance costs and
public sectors with value of time.
Step 3: Private sectors determine the toll according to
their maintenance cost.
Step 4: Public sectors travel on the highway and
private sectors collect toll as revenue.
Step 5: Government takes part of private party’s income and
invests into permanent fund.
Step 6: Government pays dividend to public sectors.
Figure 2.1: IPPP Modelling Framework
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In the following sections, without further clarification, the notion ‘IPPP’ is
refering to ‘improved IPPP’.
2.2 An MLMF Stackelberg game
As me mentioned in section 1, the private sectors in IPPP are regarded as leaders
and public sectors as followers. Let M denote the number of private sectors,
and N of public sectors. The utility function uil of private sector i = 1, . . . ,M
is determined by maintenance cost ci, the toll rate, and the flow. As there are
several private sectors in the network, the utility uil does not only depend on t
i,
the toll rate of leader i, but also the toll rate of other private sectors, t−i, and all
the flow on the road, f. Thus the utility function of private sector i is uil(t
i, t−i, f |
ci). Similarly, the utility of public sector j depends on its value of time v j, the toll
rate t, and flow on the network, f j and f− j. The utility function writes u jo(t, f j, f− j |
v j).
All the players are utility maximizers. Thus private sector i determines the
toll rate ti by maximizing the utility function given that the maintenance cost is
c. However, as all the decisions of private parties are made at the same time,
she also needs to consider, c−i, the possible maintenance cost of other parties.
ti,∗c = argmaxt∈T
Ev,c−i
[
uil(t, t
−i, f∗v,t | c)
]
,
where T is the set of all possible values t (either continuous or discrete), E
denotes expectation, t−i is used to denote t−i,∗c−i , the best strategies of other players
according to their own types for simplicity, and f∗v,t denotes the best response of
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public sectors to the toll rate t given the value of time is v.
Similarly, given the tolls on all the roads are t, the best strategy of public sec-
tor j is:
f j,∗v,t = argmaxf∈F
Ev− j
[
u jo(t, f , f
− j | v)
]
,
where F is the set of all possible value v (either continuous or discrete) and
f− j is the abbreviation of f− j,∗v− j,t, the best response of other public sectors to the toll
t given the value of time v− j.
Thus, to each private party i, the optimization problem they need to solve is:
max
t∈T
Ev,c−i
[
uil(t, t
−i, f∗v,t | c)
]
(2.1a)
s.t. f j,∗v,t = argmaxf∈F
Ev− j
[
u jo(t, f , f
− j | v)
]
∀ : j = 1, . . . ,N (2.1b)
This is a MLMF Stackelberg game formulated in bi-level programming.
2.3 Design an optimal mechanism in MLMF Stackelberg game
In problem(2.1a, 2.1b), we did not consider the role of government. Therefore
the solution of(2.1a, 2.1b) is an individual utility maximal solution, rather than
a social optimal solution. The t is the most profitable toll rate for private party
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and f is a flow that not minimizes the total travel time in the network. To make
them both social optimal, government’s regulatory is needed.
Let us assume that the government wants to maximize the expected social
welfare, that is,
max
p
Ec,vSW(p(·))
Let τc = (τ1c , . . . , τMc ) ∈ T∗ denote the social optimal toll rate given that the main-
tenance costs of all private sectors are c, and φv,t ∈ Φ∗ the optimal flow given
that the toll rates t and the value of time v. Government could change the utility
functions of public sectors and private sectors by pay dividend and charge rent,
respectively; that is, government should find a group of pl(t, f) > 0 for private
sector and po(t, f) < 0 for public sector, such that
τic = argmaxt∈T
Ev,c−i
[
uil(t, τ
−i, f∗v,t | c) − pil(t, τ−i, f)
]
∀ i = 1, . . . ,M, c ∈ C (2.2a)
φ
j
v,c = argmax
f∈F
Ev− j
[
u jo(t, f ,φ
− j | v) + p jo(t, f ,φ− j)
]
∀ j = 1, . . . ,N, v ∈ V (2.2b)
Equations(2.2a, 2.2b) indicate a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium that all the sec-
tors will take social optimal choice given that others do the same. Notice that
Ec,v
∑
i
uil(·|c) +
∑
j
u jo(·|v)
 is the expected total utility of all agents and could
serve as an indicator of total social welfare. Then the optimization problem
is:
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max
p(t,f)
Ec,v
∑
i
uil(tc, f
∗
v,t|c) +
∑
j
u jo(t, fv,t|v)
 (2.3a)
s.t. τic = argmaxt∈T
Ev,c−i
[
uil(t, τ
−i, f∗v,t | c) − pil(t, τ−i, f)
]
∀ i = 1, . . . ,M, c ∈ C
(2.3b)
φ
j
v,t = argmaxf∈F
Ev− j
[
u jo(t, f ,φ
− j | v) − p jo(t, f ,φ− j)
]
∀ j = 1, . . . ,N, v ∈ V
(2.3c)
ProblemEquations (2.3a–2.3c) a tri-level linear optimization problem and
could be solved through some existing solution method [25]. According to [26],
it is equivalent to a single-level linear programming:
max
p(t,f)
Ec,v
∑
i
uil(tc, f
∗
v,t|c) +
∑
j
u jo(t, fv,t|v)
 (2.4a)
s.t. Ev,c−i
[
uil(τ
i
c, τ
−i, f∗v,t | c) − pil(τic, τ−i, f)
]
> Ev,c−i
[
uil(t, τ
−i, f∗v,t | c) − pil(t, τ−i, f)
]
∀ i = 1, . . . ,M, c ∈ C, t ∈ T,
(2.4b)
Ev− j
[
u jo(τ, φ
j
v,t,φ
− j | v) − p jo(τ, φ jv,t,φ− j)
]
> Ev− j
[
u jo(τ, f ,φ
− j | v) − p jo(τ, f ,φ− j)
]
∀ j = 1, . . . ,N, v ∈ V, f ∈ F
(2.4c)
The implementability of the mechanism in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, or in
other word, the feasibility of problemeqs. (2.3a–2.3c), is still unclear. In the next
two sections, we first develop several theories in implementability in dominant
strategy and Bayesian equilibrium in an MLMF Stackelberg game, and then use
these results to prove the implementability of the mechanism.
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CHAPTER 3
IMPLEMENTABILITY IN DOMINANT STRATEGY AND BAYESIAN
EQUILIBRIUM IN AN MLMF STACKELBERG GAME
In this section, we will discuss the dominant strategy incentive compatibil-
ity (DSIC) and Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) in Stackelberg game with
multi-leader and multi-follower. We consider a Stackelberg game with two lev-
els in the hierarchy and multiple players in each level. We call the players in
first level as leader and the second level as follower. Thus this is a multi-leader-
multi-follower Stackelberg game.
For the consistency of the paper and the convenience of readers, we use same
symbols here as previous sections to define a multi-leader-multi-follower Stack-
elberg game. Each of the symbols in this section has its interpretation in IPPP
project, which is illustrated in section 2.
Let N denote the number of leaders, M the number of followers, and Γ the
set of all outcomes. Let C denote the type space of leaders and V the type space
of followers. Then each player, leader or follower, would have a type of herself.
For leader i, it is ci ∈ C and for follower j, v j ∈ V . Let c and v denote the types of
all leaders and followers, respectively. Each player has a utility function, which
is uil(α | ci) for the leader i and u jo(α | v j) for the follower j, where α ∈ Γ is outcome
of the game. Let C = C1 × · · · ×CN and V = V1 × · · · × VM.
At the beginning of the mechanism, all the players are revealed their own
private types. Then the leaders first report their type (not necessary to be hon-
est). Observing the leaders’ announced types, c˜, the followers report their types
v˜. After that the policy maker makes decision according to their reported types.
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The decision consists of two parts: selection of an outcome through an outcome
function g : C × V 7→ Γ and choosing payment of each players through a pay-
ment functions pl : C × V 7→ R and po : C × V 7→ R for leaders and followers,
respectively.
3.1 DSIC in MLMF Stackelberg game
Now we first confine our discussion to dominant strategy equilibrium. An out-
come function g is implementable in dominant strategies in a Stackelberg
game if:
• For each follower j = 1, . . . ,M, there exists a payment rule p jo such that for
all followers, given that the types of leaders are c, we have:
v j = argmax
v∈V j
u jo(g(c, v, v˜
− j) | v j) − p jo(c, v, v˜− j) ∀ v˜− j ∈ V/V j. (3.1)
• For each leader i = 1, . . . ,N, there exists a payment rule pil such that for all
leaders, we have:
ci = argmax
c∈Ci
uil(g(c, c˜
−i, v˜) | ci) − pil(c, c˜, v˜) ∀ c˜−i ∈ C/Ci, v˜ ∈ V (3.2)
Rewrite equation (3.1) and (3.2) in form of inequalities we have:
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uil(g(c
i, c˜−i, v˜) | ci) − pil(ci, c˜, v˜)
> uil(g(c˜
i, c˜−i, v˜) | ci) − pil(c˜i, c˜, v˜) ∀ i = 1, . . . ,M, c˜i , ci ∈ Ci, c˜−i ∈ C/Ci, v˜ ∈ V
(3.3a)
u jo(g(c, v
j, v˜− j) | v j) − p jo(c, v j, v˜− j)
> u jo(g(c, v˜
j, v˜− j) | v j) − p jo(c, v˜ j, v˜− j) ∀ j = 1, . . . ,N, v˜− j ∈ V/V j, v˜ j , v j ∈ V j
(3.3b)
For leader i, we define a directed graph Tg,l(c˜−i, v˜) by
• There are | Ci | nodes and | Ci | (| Ci | −1) directed arcs between any pair of
nodes;
• each node represents a type c ∈ Ci;
• and, for the arc from node cm ∈ Ci to cn ∈ Ci (here we omit the superscript
i), the length is uil(g(cn, c˜
−i, v˜) | cn) − uil(g(cm, c˜−i, v˜) | cn).
For the followers, similarly, we define a directed graph Tg, f (v˜− j) by
• There are | V j | nodes and | V j | (| V j | −1) directed arcs between any pair of
nodes;
• each node represents a type v ∈ V j;
• and, for the arc from node vm ∈ V j to vn ∈ V j (similarly we omit the super-
script j), the length is u jo(g(c, vn, v˜− j) | vn) − uil(g(c, vm, v˜− j) | vn).
The following theorem is immediate from Theorem 3.4.4 in [26]:
Theorem 1. If M,N > 1, then the following statements are equivalent:
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• g is implementable in dominant strategy in a multi-leader-multi-follower Stack-
elberg game.
• For every leader i and every follower j, for every report (c˜−i, v˜) and v˜− j, the graph
Tg,l(c˜−i, v˜) and Tg, f (v˜− j) does not have a finite cycle of negative length, respectively.
If the outcome space Γ is finite, we can redefine the type space C and V by
C,V ⊆ R|Γ| and for every ci ∈ C we define the mth element of it by the value that
type ci places on outcome m ∈ Γ, that is uil(m | ci). The definition of vi is similar.
Then we can similarly get the following theorem directly from Theorem 4.2.12
in [26]
Theorem 2. If Γ is finite, C,V ⊆ R|Γ| is closed and convex, uil(· | c) is convex in c,
u jo(·midv) is convex in v, and g is implementable in dominant strategy in multi-leader-
multi-follower Stackelberg game when restricted to every 2-dimensional subset of C and
V for leaders and followers, respectively, then g is IDS in MLMF Stackelberg game.
Notice that Theorem 2 needs type spaces to be convex. When type spaces are
all discrete and thus non-convex, we still could have IDS in a MLMF Stackelberg
game under some certain conditions. First we introduce Monge matrix [20]
Definition 1. Monge matrix[20]. A matrix A = (aα,β)α=1,...,I1∈N,
β=1,...,I2∈N
is a Monge matrix if
∀1 6 α < α′ 6 I1 and ∀1 6 β < β′ 6 I2 it always has aα,β + aα′,β′ > aα,β′ + aα′,β
Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. If Γ, C and V are finite, and for every i = 1, . . . ,M and j = 1, . . . ,N, there
exist an order over the outcomes in Γ, γ1, γ2, . . . and orders over type spaces in Ci and
V j, ci1, c
i
2, . . . and v
j
1, v
j
2, . . . , respectively, such that the matrix A = (aα,β) and B = (bα,β)
in which aα,β = vil(γβ | ciα) and bα,β = v jo(γβ | v jα) are Monge matrix, then g is IDS in
MLMF Stackelberg game if g aligned with the Monge domains C and V.
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The notion that a social-choice function is ‘aligned with’ a Monge domain
could be found in Definition 3 in [20]. Notice that the result of Theorem 1, The-
orem 2 and Theorem 3 could be immediately extended to a Stackelberg game
with multiple levels and multiple players in each level, which is trivial and
therefore omitted here.
3.2 BIC in MLMF Stackelberg game in linear environment
The property of DSIC is attractive to any mechanism designer. However, some-
times it is too good to be true and impossible to be achieved (as it is stated in
Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem) [9]. Thus it is necessary to gener-
alize our result in section 3.1. Now we consider the Bayesian incentive compat-
ibility in Stackelberg game in linear environment.
Definition 2. Linear environment is defined as follows,
• The type space of each agent is an interval, Ci = [
¯
ci, c¯i] for the leader i with
¯
ci < c¯i
and V j = [
¯
v j, v¯ j] for the follower j with
¯
v j < v¯ j.
• The types are independent. The probability density function Pr(·) = Pr1l (·)× · · · ×
PrMl (·) × Pr1o(·) × · · · × PrNo (·).
• Pril(ci) > 0, ∀ ci ∈ [¯c
i, c¯i], i = 1, · · · ,M and Pr jo(v j) > 0, ∀ v j ∈ [¯v
j, v¯ j], j =
1, · · · ,N.
• Each leader’s utility function is
uil(g(·)|ci) = ciνil(g) + mil + pil,
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where νil(g) is the ‘benefit’ or ‘cost’ of leader and m
i
l is initial endowment for the
leader. And each follower’s utility function is
u jo(g(·)|v j) = v jν jo(g) + m jo + p jo,
where ν jo(g) is the ‘benefit’ or ‘cost’ of follower and m
j
o is initial endowment for the
follower.
In the linear environment, we could extend Myerson’s characterization the-
orem to MLMF Stackelberg game with some minor changes.
Theorem 4. (Myerson’s characterization theorem in MLMF Stackelberg game). In a
MLMF Stackelberg game, let ν¯il and ν¯
j
o denote the expectation of νil and ν
j
o, respectively.
Then a social choice function g(·) is BIC iff. ∀ i = 1, . . . ,M, j = 1, . . . ,N
• ν¯il and ν¯ jo is non-decreasing;
• uil(ci) = uil(¯c
i) +
∫ ci
¯
ci
ν¯il(s)ds, ∀ci and u jo(v j) = u jo(¯v
j) +
∫ v j
¯
v j
ν¯
j
o(s)ds, ∀v j.
Theorem 4 gives us a way to construct a mechanism that is BIC in linear envi-
ronment and we will design the IPPP project using this theorem in the following
section.
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CHAPTER 4
MECHANISMS IN IPPP CONTEXT
4.1 Designing an indirect mechanism
As we pointed out in section 1 and section 2, IPPP project could be model in a
Stackelberg game with two levels, where private parties are leaders and public
sectors are followers. Government acts as mechanism designer in the process.
Before the game, government first announce the payment (could be positive
or negative) for each players according to different outcome pil(v, f) > 0 and
p jo(v, f) < 0, where v is the toll rates on highways and f is the flow in the net-
work. Then, private parties and public sectors are revealed with their ‘types’:
maintenance cost ci ∈ C and value of time (VOT) v j ∈ V . The private parties
first decide the toll rate t on the highways they are managing to maximize their
profits:
ti,∗c = argmax
t∈T i
Ev,c−i
{
Iil(t, t
−i, f∗v,t) −Ω(ci, f∗v,t) − pil(t, t−i, f∗v,t) − U il
}
, i = 1, . . . ,M
where Iil(t, f ) is the income from toll, Ω(c, f ) is the maintenance cost, f
∗ is the
optimal responses of public sectors to the toll rates, and U il is the one-time in-
vestment and its possible return if private sector invest it elsewhere. Observing
the toll rate on each road, public sectors make route choice decisions by mini-
mizing their own travel costs:
f j,∗v,t = argmax
f∈F j
Ev− j
{
−p jo(t, f− j, f j) − I jo(t, f− j, f j) − Θ(v j, f j, f− j) + U jo
}
, j = 1, . . . ,N
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where I jo is the payment for toll from public sector to private sector, Θ( f , v) is
total monetized travel cost, and U jo is the total travel cost without IPPP. After
these are finished, the toll rate t and travel amount f are observed and govern-
ment charge private party i with pil(t, f) and pay public sector j with p
i
o(t, f).
As in problemeqs. (2.4a–2.4c), we want to implement the mechanism with
Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. Then all the
players’ utility functions are maximized when all of them make social optimal
decision. Also we want to ensure that, even under worst condition, the solution
of problemeqs. (2.4a–2.4c) is larger than 0 so that no agent will deviate from the
project. So the problem becomes:
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max
p(t,f):
t∈T
f∈F
Ec,v
∑
i
uil(tc, f
∗
v,t|c) +
∑
j
u jo(t, fv,t|v)
 (4.1a)
s.t. Ev,c−i
{
Iil(τ
i
c, τ
−i
c−i , f
∗
v,τc) −Ω(c, f∗v,τc) − pil(τic, τ−ic−i , f∗v,τc)
}
> Ev,c−i
{
Iil(t, τ
−i
c−i , f
∗
v,τc) −Ω(c, f∗v,τc) − pil(t, τ−ic−i , f∗v,τc)
}
∀ i = 1, . . . ,M, t ∈ T i, c ∈ Ci,
(4.1b)
Ev− j
{
−p jo(τc,φ− jv− j , φ jv) − I jo(τc,φ− jv− j , φ jv) − Θ(v, φ jv,φ− jv− j)
}
> Ev− j
{
−p jo(τc,φ− jv− j , f ) − I jo(τc,φ− jv− j , f ) − Θ(v, f ,φ− jv− j)
}
∀ j = 1, . . . ,N, c ∈ C, v ∈ V j, f ∈ F j,
(4.1c)
Ev,c−i
{
Iil(τ
i
c, τ
−i
c−i , f
∗
v,τc) − M(c, f∗v,τc) − pil(τic, τ−ic−i , f∗v,τc) − U il
}
> 0
∀ i = 1, . . . ,M, c ∈ C,
(4.1d)
Ev− j
{
−p jo(τc,φ− jv− j , φ jv) − I jo(τc,φ− jv− j , φ jv) − Θ(v, φ jv,φ− jv− j) + U jo
}
> 0
∀ j = 1, . . . ,N, c ∈ C, v ∈ V j,
(4.1e)
The objective functioneq. (4.1a) is the total utility of all agents, i.e. the social
welfare. The inequalityeq. (4.1b) andeq. (4.1c) denote the Bayesian incentive
compatibility. The inequalitieseq. (4.1d) andeq. (4.1e) ensure that outcomes from
IPPP project is better than deviation, where the deviated agent gets 0. Let gi
denote the indirect mechanism we formulated above.
22
4.2 Equivalent direct mechanism
Through the proof of Revelation Principle, we could prove that this mechanism
is equivalent to a direct mechanism in MLMF Stackelberg game. Thus we have
the following definition.
Definition 3. Equivalent direct mechanism to problemeqs. (4.1a–4.1e). For an
indirect mechanism described in problemeqs. (4.1a–4.1c), there is an equivalent direct
mechanism gd in which there are M leaders and N followers with type spaces C and V
respectively. Players report their types c˜ and v˜ in a Stackelberg game. Then the policy
maker decides the allocation and payment. For leader i, the allocation is:
σil(c˜) = Ev,c−i
[
−Ω(c˜, f∗v,τc˜)
]
, (4.2)
and the payment to government is
Ev,c−i
[
Iil(τ
i
c˜, τ
−i
c−i , f
∗
v,τc˜) + p
i
l(τ
i
c˜, τ
−i
c˜−i , f
∗
v,τc˜) + U
i
l
]
For the follower j, the allocation is
σ jo(v˜) = Ev− j
[
−Θ(v˜, φ jv˜,φ− jv− j)
]
, (4.3)
and the payment to government is
Ev− j
[
−I jo(τc,φ− jv− j , φ jv˜) + p jo(τc,φ− jv− j , φ jv) − U jo
]
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In the equivalent direct mechanism, all the players report their types and
the amount of ‘Goods’ allocated is determined by the strategy function of each
player ineqs. (4.1a–4.1e).
In mechanism gd, the utility function of each player is not changed, but we
redefine the allocation and money transfer functions. We could have the follow-
ing lemma:
Lemma 5. (Linear environment) In mechanism gd, if the utility functions satisfy the
following assumptions, then it is a linear environment.
• Ω(c, f ) = c · ω(c, f ),
• Θ(v, f ) = v · θ(v, f ),
• Ci and V j are bounded intervals, ∀ i, j,
• All ci and v j are independent,
• The distribution function of ci on Ci and v j on V j is strictly positive,
Proof is straightforward through Definition 2. Therefore, according to The-
orem 4, in a linear environment the utility functions of leaders and followers
should satisfy,
uil(gd|c) = uil(gd|¯c) −
∫ c
¯
c
ω(s, f)ds, (4.4a)
u jo(gd|v) = u jo(gd|¯v) −
∫ v
¯
v
θ(s, f)ds. (4.4b)
Then we could get the possible money transfer that satisfies Bayesian incen-
tive compatibility. Notice that the utility functions of leaders and followers are
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calculated by
uil(t, f|c) = Ev,c−i
[
−c ω(c, f) + Iil(t, f) − pil(t, f) − U il
]
(4.5a)
u jo(t, f|v) = Ev− j
[
−v θ(v, f) − I jo(t, f) − p jo(t, f) + U jo
]
(4.5b)
From (4.4a) and (4.4b), we could get the payment from private sector i to the
government:
pil(t, f) = −uil(t, f|¯c) +
∫ c
¯
c
ω(s, f )ds − Ev,c−i
[
c ω(c, f) − Iil(t, f)
]
− U il
Similarly, from (4.4b) and (4.4b), we could get the payment from the public
sector j to the government:
p jo(t, f) = −u jo(t, f|¯v) +
∫ v
¯
v
θ(s, f )ds − Ev− j
[
v θ(v, f) + I jo(t, f)
]
+ U jo
4.3 Social optimum and budget balance
If the government set the social optimal toll rate for private party and social op-
timal flow for public party (although it is not practical), then the total payment
under social optimal should be (for simplicity we write τc,v as τ and φc,v as φ)
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∑
i
pil(τ,φ) +
∑
j
p jo(τ,φ) =
∑
i
−uil(τ,φ|¯c) +
∫ c
¯
c
ω(s,φ)ds − Ev,c−i
[
c ω(c,φ) − Iil(τ,φ)
]
− U il

+
∑
j
u jo(τ,φ|¯v) +
∫ v
¯
v
θ(s,φ)ds − Ev− j
[
v θ(v,φ) + I jo(τ,φ)
]
+ U jo

= −
∑
i
uil(τ,φ|¯c) − Ev,c−i
∫ c
¯
c
ω(s,φ)ds

−
∑
j
u jo(τ,φ|¯v) − Ev− j
∫ v
¯
v
θ(s,φ)ds

−
∑
i
{
Ev,c−i
[
cω(c,φ)
]
+ U il
}
+
∑
j
{
−Ev− j [vθ(v,φ)] + U jo}
+
∑
i
Ev,c−i
[
Iil(τ,φ)
]
−
∑
j
Ev− j
[
I jo(τ,φ)
]
= −Total utility of private sectors − Total utility of public sectors
− total cost for private sectors
+ Total travel cost improvement for public sectors + I
(4.8)
Where I = ∑i Ev,c−i [Iil(τ,φ)] − ∑ j Ev− j [I jo(τ,φ)]. In the following sections, we
will discuss on different I to see what (4.8) is telling us.
4.3.1 I ≈ 0
This condition will be true when number of private sectors, N, is really large.
As the type of each private sector is independently distributed, the interim ex-
pectation of total toll income will be close to ex post total toll income. Then it is
easy to get the total expense of government is
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Government’s total expense = Total utility of private sectors + Total utility of public sectors
+ Total cost for private sectors
− Total travel cost improvement for public sectors
(4.9)
It is obviously that the the first three elements of (4.9) is positive and total travel
cost improvement should less than total utility of public sectors. (Otherwise the
cost of toll will be larger than total travel cost without IPPP which is unrealistic.)
This indicates that government should pay for social optimum, while the total
amount is less than the government needs to pay without an IPPP.
Then we could get the total utility of all sectors when it is budget-balanced,
that is Government’s total expense equals 0:
Total utility when budget is balanced = Total travel cost improvement for public sectors
− Total cost for private sectors
So that as long as the improvement of total travel cost is larger than to-
tal maintenance and construction cost, the IPPP project could be both budget-
balanced and interim Pareto efficient.
4.3.2 I , 0
When I , 0, the interim expectation of toll income is different from the ex post
income. This could due to the number of private sector, N, is small or an increase
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or decrease of maintenance cost among all private sectors. Notice that when the
realization of the cost c is relatively low, we will have
∑
i
Ev,c−i
[
Iil(τ,φ)
]
>
∑
j
Ev− j
[
I jo(τ,φ)
]
,
and vice versa. This means that when the maintenance cost is low, the gov-
ernment could pay less for achieving social optimum, whereas when the cost
is high, the government should compensate the private sectors more. Thus im-
provement in road construction and maintenance technology and reduction of
maintenance cost is a win-win situation for both government and private sec-
tors. This gives government incentives to encourage and support private com-
pany to invest more in research and development (R&D).
4.4 Can government achieve social optimum for free?
From the discussion in section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, we could have the following equa-
tion
Government’s total expense =Total net social benefit +
∑
Private
sectors
one-time and maintenance cost
−
∑
Public
sectors
Travel cost improvement − I
If it is budget balanced, the government’s expense equals 0 and then the total
net social benefit should become
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Total social net benefit =
∑
Public
sectors
Travel cost improvement−
∑
Private
sectors
one-time and maintenance cost+I
(4.10)
At the worst case, for example the maintenance cost for all private sectors are
extremely high. Let −Iw indicates the value of I at this time. Then the total
social net benefit becomes
∑
Public
sectors
Travel cost improvement −
∑
Private
sectors
one-time and maintenance cost − Iw
(4.11)
Thus we have the following theorem:
Theorem 6. The government could achieve social optimum and budget balance at the
same time if and only if (4.11)≥ 0.
Remark 1. (4.11) could be generalized as
Total social net beneft = Total cost improvement or benefit − Total one-time and recurrent cost
−Difference between interim and ex post expected income at worst case
(4.12)
This shows that in analyzing the viability of IPPP (or PPP) projects, it is not
sufficient to conduct benefit-cost analysis, because the net benefit of the society
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does not simply equal to “benefit minus cost”, but is also related to the differ-
ence in interim expected toll income and ex post toll income. This consideration
is extremely important to avoid renegotiation brought by cost overruns.
Remark 2. Theorem 6 gives us a way to evaluate and determine whether
a potential project could achieve both social optimal and budget balance. This
is really necessary given some, if not a lot, examples that projects need to be
renegotiated.
Remark 3. If (4.11) < 0, the government should trade off between budget
balance and social optimum. For example, the government could sacrifice the
utility of private sectors or public sectors to keep budget balanced. Or, which
we would recommend, the government could pay a limit amount money to se-
cure the social optimum. Notice that without IPPP, the government should pay
∑
Private
sectors
one-time and maintenance cost
to get the same level of service. Thus, as long as government’s total expense is
less than this amount, the IPPP could still be a Pareto improvement. The total
social net benefit becomes
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0 < Total social net benefit
=
∑
Public
sectors
Travel cost improvement −
∑
Private
sectors
one-time and maintenance cost
− Iw + Government’s total expense
<
∑
Public
sectors
Travel cost improvement − Iw.
Remark 4. If (4.11) <
∑
Private
sectors
one-time and maintenance cost, then the govern-
ment needs to pay more than it needs to pay under public provision, that means
IPPP is not suitable for government to limit its expense budget.
We will illustrate the above results through a numerical example in section
5. Then we will compare different forms of PPP projects together.
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CHAPTER 5
PROJECT IN SIOUX-FALLS NETWORK
Sioux-Falls Network is a 24-zone, 24-node and 76-link road network. It is
widely used in traffic assignment problem [17]. All the related files used in
this paper could be accessed through [2]. The map of Sioux-Falls network is
shown in Figure 5.1. In this section, we first verify the feasibility of IPPP project
on Sioux-Falls network, then find out the optimal implementation, and at last
illustrate the performance of the project.
Link 43
Figure 5.1: Sioux-Falls Network
For simplicity, we assume that there is only one private party and one public
party in the problem. There is only one link that is leased to the private party
(link 58, from node 15 to node 10, marked in Figure 5.1). This is a special case of
the model we discuss here, but the result could be easily generalized to multi-
player case.
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Table 5.1: Feasibility under different scenarios
Scenarios Low Cost Medium Cost High Cost
Total Travel Time Improvement (M$) 3.4124 3.1300 1.9640
Expected Cost (M$) 0.6155 1.2305 1.8457
Risk Factor (M$) 1.6561 1.6311 1.2269
Improvement - Cost - Risk (M$) 1.1408 0.2684 −1.1086
5.1 Social optimal and budget-balanced
A PPP project is social optimal and budget-balanced, as it is pointed out in The-
orem 6 in Section 4.4, when total travel cost improvement is larger than the sum
of total one-time and maintenance cost and worst risk factor. If this condition
is satisfied, the private and public party will not deviate from the game. The
value of these three factors under different scenarios is shown in Table 5.1. It is
obvious that in low cost and medium cost scenarios, the condition of Theorem 6
is satisfied. However in high cost scenario, the inequality is not satisfied. From
the discussion of Theorem 6, although we could not achieve social optimal and
budget-balanced project at the same time, IPPP is still beneficial because gov-
ernment could pay 1.1086 million dollars to achieve social optimal, which is
less than 1.8457 million dollars. Thus we could conclude that IPPP should be
implemented in the network.
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5.2 Evaluation
To evaluate the merit of utilizing IPPP in infrastructure management, we com-
pare the results of implementing IPPP with those of other three approaches. We
implement IPPP, original IPPP and PPP on the same link in the same network.
The costs and VOTs are the same and private sectors in three scenarios could
choose toll rates from the same set. Net benefits are calculated by the utility of
the sector in current scenario subtracted by the utility of the same sector under
government provision. The simulation result is shown in Figure 5.2.
It is obviously that all three approaches could achieve ex ante potential
Pareto-improvement compared with government provision. Notice that they
all have risks to make private sector to get negative net benefit, which means
that they all have chances to end up with project failures or deviation of private
sectors. But it is noteworthy that improved IPPP and PPP has relatively less
chance to fail (the amounts of failure times are smaller, see Table 5.2) and less
loss when come to failures (as marked by dashed line on Figure 5.2). Another
apparent trend is that both improved IPPP and original IPPP guarantee higher
net benefit of public sector than PPP. This shows the advantages of improved
IPPP we mentioned in section 1 - It provides better public support, better regu-
latory on road pricing than PPP and lower financial risk and better regulatory
than original IPPP.
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Figure 5.2: The net benefit of public and private sector in implementation
of improved IPPP, original IPPP and PPP
Table 5.2: Failure time of three approaches
Total number of simulation Improved IPPP Original IPPP PPP
200 each 24 Failures 139 Failures 63 Failures
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In urban transportation, the brownfield highway project, which aims at man-
aging existing highways, is difficult to be implemented and to get best result.
The current government provision way has many disadvantages, such as insuf-
ficient fund, relatively high operating and maintaining cost, and tax distortion.
The prevailing Public-Private Partnership (PPP), is widely used to overcome
these shortcomings. However, whether PPP could provide government social
optimum and budget balance at the same time is still questioned. Moreover,
regulating the private party on road pricing is another problem [23]. Thus [10]
proposed that return part of the revenue from the road pricing to gain public
support. However, [10] do not provide direct proof or example to support this
proposal.
In this paper, we presented a method to model, implement and evaluate the
improved Investment Public-Private Partnership (IPPP) through mechanism
design in a multi-leader-multi-follow (MLMF) Stackelberg game. We derived
and proved the theories of implementability in dominant strategy (IDS) equilib-
rium in Stackelberg game when the type space is continuous or discrete. Then
we used these theories to develop our modelEquations (4.1a–4.1e), and proved
its feasibility. We applied the model to Sioux-Falls network for illustration.
The improved IPPP in our paper is different from the one in [10] in the fol-
lowing way: in the improved IPPP, the rent rates that government charges from
the private sectors are floating according to the decision made by private and
public sectors. This could help government to regulate the road pricing and at
the same time reduce the risk when the maintenance cost is extremely high and
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Table 6.1: Advantages of improved IPPP over following management
forms
Potential
Pareto-
improvement
Relief of
tax
distortion
Public
support
Better
regulatory
on
road pricing
Lower
financial
risk
Government
provision
√ √
-
√
-
PPP - -
√ √
-
Original
IP PP - - -
√ √
harmful to the financial viability of the project. From our analysis and results,
we could claim that our improved IPPP has following advantages compared
with government provision, PPP and original IPPP, shown in Table 6.1:
Besides answering the question, whether social optimal PPP is free or not,
our paper contributes in both methodology side and application side. On
methodology side, we derived the implementability of dominant strategy equi-
librium and Bayesian equilibrium in multi-leader-multi-follower Stackelberg
game and apply the results in proof of feasibility of IPPP. On application side,
our paper is the first to apply mechanism design in transportation infrastructure
management context. Similar method and idea could be used in management
of other infrastructures, such as tunnel, bridge and power grid where private
information is held by agents.
Several future work directions are interesting and promising. Our model is
a one stage model, thus the interaction between different stages and informa-
tion update is not taken into consideration. With tools in dynamic mechanism
design, the model could be more precise if it is developed as a multi-stage one.
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Another possible direction we would suggest is that when one considers
multi-modal transportation, such as including bus or public transit into the
model, IPPP has an additional advantage that it could help the development
of public transportation and reduce of emission. The effect of IPPP on such side
would be significant.
Others, such as incorporate more sophisticated and accurate road pricing
and maintenance model, could also be worth of investigation.
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APPENDIX A
NOMENCLATURE
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NOMENCLATURE
Φ∗ The set of all social optimal
flow φv,t
φv,t The optimal flow when value
of time is v and toll rate is t
τc The social optimal toll rate
when maintenance cost is c
Γ The set of all outcomes in a
Stackelberg game
C The type space of all lead-
ers/private sectors; C = C1 ×
· · · ×CN
V The type space of all follow-
ers/ public sectors; V = V1 ×
· · · × VM
f− j The flow of other public sec-
tors except j
Pr(·) The probability density distri-
bution of types of all agents
T∗ The set of all social optimal
toll rate τc
t−i The toll rate of other private
sectors except i
νil(·) Part of utility function of
leader in linear environment
Ω(c, f) Maintenance cost expendi-
ture for private party
Θ(v, f) Total time loss for public sec-
tor
c˜ Reported types of lead-
ers/private sectors
v˜ Reported types of followers/
public sectors
C The set of all possible mainte-
nance cost c
ci Maintenance cost and type of
leader i
F The set of all possible flow f
f j Flow on the road travelled by
follower j and strategy of fol-
lower j
f j,∗v,t The best strategy of public
sector j given the value of
time v and toll rate t
g The outcome function
40
gd The direct mechanism equiv-
alent to gi
gi The indirect mechanism in
IPPP context
I(v, f) toll revenue for private party
M Number of private sectors
mil Initial endowment for the
leader
m jo Initial endowment for the fol-
lower
N Number of public sectors
pil Payment function of
leader/private sector i
p jo Payment function of fol-
lower/public sector j
SW(·) Social welfare function
T Set of all possible toll t
ti Toll rate on the road leased to
private party i and strategy of
leader i
ti,∗c The optimal toll rate for pri-
vate party i with maintenance
cost c
U il Private sector i’s one-time in-
vestment to IPPP projects and
its possible return if invested
elsewhere
uil Utility function of leader (pri-
vate sector) i
U jo Total travel cost for public
sector j without IPPP
u jo Utility function of follower
(public sector) j
V The set of all possible value of
time v
v j Value of time and type of fol-
lower j
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